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INraODUCTION
Recent emphasis on improvements to the federal budgetary process have
resulted from a realization that although the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
and subsequent ancillary legislation have been great steps forward in proper
administration of public funds, much remains to be done, both in the budgetary
field and in that of the associated legislative processes. One change that
has been suggested, and for which legislation has been proposed^ is that of
conferring on the Chief Executive the power of the line item veto in appropria-
tion bills. An examination of the suggestion raises at once such questions as:
whence came the idea; what has been experience with its use in state govern^
ment; could it be introduced by statutory action or would a Constitutional
Amendment be needed; should it be made at all an integral part of further
budget reform?
Such questions are important. There is a dearth of published studies
in the state legislative and budgetary processes, yet it is only from state
government that we can obtain any performance data, somewhat non-applicable
though it is. When there is published material, it usually deals with narrow
segments or phases of the legislative process in a particular state, or a
selected group of states « rather than throughout all states.^ Although there
has been some study of the question of the item veto in the states, and reviews
Oliver Douglas Weeks, Research in the American State Legislative
Process
. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: J. W. Edwards, 1947), pp. 4-6. Written under
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2of its use, there is limited extension of that information to federal goverii-
ment application. And attempts to introduce the item veto into the federal
government make vague, general references to state use, but little more.
In 1941 the Social Science Research Council, in an outline of suggested
research topics in budgetary matters, included the item veto. The Council
puts its questions thus:
When the Chief Executive possesses the power to veto particular
items in an appropriation measure, is the power much exercised?
How influential is the threat of using such power? Can the leqis-
lature avoid the exercise of the item veto by combining an appro-
priation for a purpose that the chief executive does not favor with
a purpose that he favors? Is the power of the item veto ever exer-
cised when the legislature cannot increase the chief executive's
budget request ?2
The following chapters explore the foregoing questions. The study
logically divides itself into two main parts: the item veto in state govern-
fflent, and the item veto in federal government. But an attempt will be made
in a third division of the study to show something of the relationship between
the two.
2
Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research
Council. Research in Public Budget Administration
.
(New York; 1941: repro-
duced from typewritten copy by the Council), p. 22.
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The power of the Chief Executive to disapprove the action of the Legis-<
lative branch of a governraent, state or national, is called the veto. The
veto may take many forms; it may be absolute, with no power given the Legis-
lative branch to overrule the disapproval; it may be conditional, with the
power of the Legislative branch, by a stated proportion such as a majority or
two-thirds vote to overrule the disapproval; it may be partial, with the Chief
Executive given the power to approve some parts of the action while disapprov-
ing the rest. This last typo of veto is called the line item veto, or simply
the item veto. Before proceeding with the study which forms the subject of
this paper, it seems appropriate to review the introduction of the veto power
into state and national government; for the item veto entered the political
science field only in the last hundred years of United States history.
Prior to the Revolutionary War the various colonies were governed by
colonial governors. They had many powers which made them all but dictators
over the citizens. One of these powers consisted of the absolute veto. This
veto was used, in the opinion of the citizens, in an arbitrary and unjust
fashion, and was one of the major complaints of the framers of the Declaration
of Independence.
The royal veto.
. . . was not used unsparingly in the early colonial
period. For example, a single order of the queen^s ministers in 1706
disallowed fifty Pennsylvania laws. Of course, some of the colonial
acts were vetoed because they were in conflict with acts of Parliament
4
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sor with the contrnon law. Others were vetoed because they were inimi-
cal to British economic interests.
The distaste and fear of executive tyranny carried over into early state con-
stitutions. As might be expected, fear led to overcompensation.
Reaction seldom follows a middle course, and in this case [of power
of the governor] the pendulum swung to the other extreme , . . Remem-
bering the effective check which the colonial governor had interposed
upon popular measures by means of the veto, the constituent bodies of
this period [c. 1787], in all but three states, removed the veto al-
together. In Btessachusetts the governor was allowed a qualified veto.
The first New York constitution provided [a system whereby] the gov-
ernor could exercise a veto.. . . South Carolina also gave the veto
to the governor, but later took it away again.. . . But by the end
of the century a qualified veto ivas reintroduced in four states.^
Indeed, with the fear amounting to a psychosis it is remarkable that the
federal constitution contained the veto at all, and that the veto was intro-
duced into the state constitutions as soon as it was. During the Constitutional
Convention the term "veto" was carefully avoided, and the substitute phrase
"qualified negative" took its place; the term continued in use for more
than a hundred years, and is found in various veto messages of the Presidents,
3
as for example in one of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1879. The framers of the
Constitution were foresighted enough to realize that lack of an executive
veto would be a serious defect in the legislative process, and would omit a
necessary check on the power of the Legislative branch. The states came,
sooner or later, to the same conclusion, and with one exception all states
Cullen B. Gosnell and Lynnwood M. Holland, State and Local Government
in the United States
.
(New York; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), pp. 307-308.
2
Margaret Charlotte Alexander (nee Marsh), The Development of the Power
of the State Executive . "Smith College Studies in History," Vol. II, No. 3;
(Northampton, Mass.: Smith College, 1917), pp. 157-161.
3
James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents . 1789-1697].
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have now incorporated the veto into their constitutions.
Th© item veto is, very simply, the extension of the veto power to in-
clude the right to veto a single item within a bill, rather than to veto the
entire bill. Such a veto was never envisaged by the representatives attend-
ing the v/onstitutional Convention, or if it was, it was never mentioned.
The proposal was first introduced into the Constitution of the Confederate
States of America, for reasons best explained by Robert H. Smith, one of the
framers of that constitution, in an address delivered at Temperance Hall,
Mobile, Alabama, 3u March 1661. Be stated:
Save • • • (changes which the urgent necessity of the occasion
demanded) we have followed with almost literal fidelity the Con-
stitution of the United States, and departed from its text only so
far as experience had clearly proven that additional checks were re-
quired for the preservation of the Nation*s interest. Of this char-
acter is the power given the President to arrest corrupt or illegit-
imate expenditures, by vetoing particular clauses in an appropria-
tion bill, and at the same time approving other parts of the bill.
There is hardly a more flagrant abuse of it's Qsic] power, by the
Congress of the United States than the habitual practice of loading
bills, which are necessary for governmental operations with repre-
hensible, not to say venal dispositions of the public money, and
which only obtain favor by a system of combinations among members
interested in similar abuses upon the treasury.
A provision to prevent the legislature's throwing in extraneous
items and hoping the executive would connive or ignore them vms
made by prohibiting Congress from appropriating money "from the
treasury unless it be asked for by the President • . . except for
... its own expenses ... or settlement of judicial claims*. . ."
By giving the President the power to veto objectionable items in
the appropriation bills, we have, I trust, greatly purified our gov-
ernment, and, at the same time, placed its different parts in nearer
^h^ exception is North Carolina, hereinafter discussed.
5
V. L. W. , **The Item Veto in the American Constitutional System",





7and more harmonious relations.
The provisional constitution of 8 February 1861, provided that "The President
nay veto any appropriation or appropriations in the same bill". This same
provision in slightly altered form was adopted in the permanent constitution
of 11 March 1861* Georgia and Texas in 1865 and 1866 respectively included
this power in their proposed constitutions under the presidential plan of re^*
construction. Subsequently every new state admitted to the Union, and many of
the older states by amendment or new constitution granted their governors the
7
power of the item veto.
Before tracing the gradual introduction of the item veto into the
several state constitutions, there should be mentioned one further aspect
behind the introduction of this executive tool into the Confederate legisla-
tive process. This aspect was that the item veto was an integral part of a
plan to adapt English budget principles to American conditions in order to
secure greater harmony between the executive and the legislature. From the
outset the item veto in the Confederate States was directly associated with
an executive budget; it was a defense for the President to use against unwar-
ranted or unauthorized legislative increases; and the legislature was specif-
ically enjoined against initiating appropriations, with certain exceptions
8
previously enumerated in Smithes address. The framers of the Constitution
Robert H. Smith, Address to the Citizens of Alabama on the Constitu-
tion and Laws of the Confederate States of America ^ (Mobile: Mobile Daily
Register Print, 1861), pp. 7-11.
Niels H. Debel, The Veto Power of the Governor of Illinois , "Univer-
sity of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences", Vol, VI, Nos. 1 and 2;
(Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois, 1917), p. 23.
Roger H. Wells, "The Item Veto and State Budget Reform," The American
Political Science Review . XVIII, (November, 1924), pp. 782-83.
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8of the Confederacy liked what they saw of the English budgetary process, yet
would hardly go so far as to depart entirely from the American form of govern-
ment with its separation of powers in the Mcntesquieu tradition i^erely to
achieve improvements in the budget process. The introduction of the item veto
was a part of their compromise solution. The length of time, and the condi-
tions under which the constitution operated^ were of course in no way suffic-




INTRODUCTION INTO STATE CONSTnUT IONS
In the decade following the war between the United States and the Con-
federate States and the rebirth of the Union, state after state introduced the
item veto. Georgia and Texas were previously mentioned, although they did not
formally have the veto until 1876 and 1877 as a result of problems of recon-
struction. In 1872 West Virginia introduced the item veto; in 1873 Pennsyl-
vania; in 1874 Arkansas and New York; so that finally by 1930 there were—and
still are today—thirty-nine states with provisions for the item veto in their
constitutions. By organic act of Congress, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and
(prior to its independence) the Philippines included the item veto in their
governors* powers.
Was the idea conceived by the Confederacy so startling and brilliant
that no one had ever thought of before, else he would have moved sooner to
have it introduced into the legislative process, either for the appropriation
bills only or for general legislation? Or was it, essentially, something which
would have come anyway in due course, possibly sooner had the war not inter-
fered for a decade? One is inclined toward the latter view, when it is re-
membered that the Union had only existed for a little over half a century, and
that is a short span of time in legislative life. It seems most probable that
a necessary step prior to the item veto's introduction was a certain amount of
For a complete list of states, with dates of introduction of the
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experience without it. One finds such comments as the following by students of
the appropriations process in the states:
The necessity of this fitem veto] provision is found in legis-
lative experience. The mutual exchange of courtesies by members
of the legislature whereby one agrees to support the appropriations
desired by others, in the consideration that others will support
those in which he is interested, has led to extravagance and many
vicious appropriations..
. .
The restrictions contained in this
section, it is anticipated^ will prevent such practice with dis-
tinct benefit resulting to the state,
2
Other indications are that the item veto was originally conceived more for the
purpose of giving the governor power to eliminate unconstitutional, improper,
or illegal items than for that of reducing the political machinations of the
"pork-barrel" and "log-rolling" legislators. Such reason, at least as far as
the appropriations bills went, faded into a secondary significance in comparison
to that of reducing unwarranted expenditures. The extravagant habits of legis-
latures and their failure to assume full responsibility for living within
state revenues encouraged, indeed all but demanded the introduction of the
item veto.^
There is possibly another explanation to the half-century between the
beginnings of the states and the introduction of the item veto. In the early
days of the Onion, emphasis was on the needs of the infant nation, and the
great leaders of the day, both state and national, many of whom had been per-
sonally through the pangs of birth, were probably more concerned with the prob-
lems of the United States than with those of individual states. A few decades
2
John A, Perkins, The Role of the Governor in Michigan in the Enactment
of Appropriations
.
(Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1943,)
p. 52, quoting Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the
State of Michigan . II, 1423,
3
Ibid . See also Arthur N. Holcombe, State Government in the United
States . 3d. ed., rev. & enl. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1935),pp. 360-62
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later, with the earlier patriots and statesmen faded from the scene, and with
the United States firmly on the world stage as a tested and proved independent
nation, local and sectional interests became more predominant. Some credence
to this argument stems from such statements as that by President Hayes, though
he was admittedly discussing a federal, not a state matter, when he wrote:
The practice of attacking [sic] to appropriation bills measures not
pertinent to such bills did not prevail until more than forty years
after the adoption of the Constitution.
The form that the constitutional provisions take are almost standard.
That for Pennsylvania is quite typical:
Article IV, Section 16 . The Governor shall have the power to dis-
approve of any item or items of any bill, making appropriations of
money, embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the bill
approved shall be the law, and the item or items disapproved shall
be void, unless repassed according to the rules and limitations pre-
scribed for the passage of other bills over the Governor's veto,^
Wordings for several other states and for the Territories of Alaska, Hawaii,
and Puerto Rico are given in Appendix B, together with the sources from which
taken. Differences of note can be observed in the case of .Washington and also
that of Oregon.
Although nearly all the states feel they have gone far enough
with the item veto when the governor is empowered to strike out or
reduce parts of an appropriation bill, Washington authorizes him to
veto a part of any bill and Oregon to veto items in new bills de-
claring an emergency."
A significant difference is found in the case of Massachusetts, which in 191U
added provisions for the item veto by amendment, excerpted as follows (italios
4
Richardson, 0£. cit .. p. 528.
5
New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, 1938, Constitu-
tions of the States and the United States . Ill , (Albany: J. B. Lyon Co., 1933).
6
Cladius 0. Johnson, American State and Local Government . 2d ed.
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956), p. 62.
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Amendments. Article LXIII. Section 5 . The Governor may disapprove
or reduce items 0£ parts of items in any bill appropriating money,
'
The Committee on State Government of the National Municipal League believes
that a state constitution should go as far in strengthening the governor's veto
as to insert the item veto and add the authority to reduce as well as elim-
inate items; that is to say, they favor a type of veto provision similar to
that of Massachusetts. Their recommendation as to wording states:
Article VII. Section 704 . The Governor may strike out or reduce
items in appropriation bills passed by the legislature, and the
procedure in such cases shall be the same as in the case of the
disapproval of an entire bill by the governor.
^
In the discussion of the provision for this power, the League reasons that
as a safeguard against ill-advised action by the legislature either
in changing the general appropriation bill or in passing special ap-
propriation bills, the Governor is given the power to veto, as a
whole or in part, items in such bills,
^
In so stating, the League is hardly as blunt as Robert anith in referring to
10
such action by the legislature as corrupt, reprehensible, or venal. But the
fact that the provision is there is proof enough of their understanding of
past performances of (state) legislative bodies.
It was mentioned previously that one state, North Carolina, is the
single exception to the fact that each of the Onited States has some provision
7Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Manual for the General Court , 1955-6 ,
(Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Company, 1955), p. 122. The complete amend-
ment is given in Appendix B.
Committee on State Government, National Municipal League, Model State
Constitution
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for the executive veto in its constitution. Why, although other states of
the colonial period adopted the veto after starting statehood life without it,
has North Carolina found it inexpedient or unnecessary? Probably the best
single study of the governmental process in that state is found in Robert
Bankings very complete book, in which he observes:
Where the veto power is used, the basis given for its exercise
by chief executives has been on the grounds of public interest and
expediency. Why then has North Carolina found it unnecessary to
use this instrument, which is gaining in importance in other states?
It is indeed difficult to find a satisfactory answer. The control
of the staters legislative machinery by the Democratic party makes
a veto for purely party reasons unnecessary, and the governor
through his message power is able to acquaint the legislature with
his legislative desires. This, in most instances, is all that is
necessary for the governor to secure his way. If legislation is
passed contrary to the wish of the governor, it makes for party
harmony, so many say, not to have measures of this type vetoed.
This is not a satisfactory explanation but is as logical as any
that has been suggested. It is the writer's belief that if a con-
stitutional convention should be called within the near future in
North Carolina, the veto power would be given to the governor. ^^
It is therefore essentially a unanimous belief in government at the state
level that the item veto for appropriation bills is a necessary and integral
part of the budgetary and legislative process. Before passing to a review of
the manner in which this type of veto has been used since its inception, it
is of interest to note that even in some cases of city government the same
belief holds. City government organization is of course vastly different in
most respects from that of state government, employing many types and kinds of
mayor-council, city manager, and mixed relationships. Yet in 1.5 percent of
the cities of population over 10,000 the item veto power over the budget rests
Robert S. Rankin, The Government and Administration of North Carolina,
a volume of American Commonwealths Series , ed. W. Brooke Graves (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955), pp. 88-Q9.
ll
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with the executive. ^2
William Anderson and Edward W. Weidner, State and Local Government,
(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1951), p. 536. See also, by the same authors,




USE BY THE GOVERNOR
With the need for the item veto so strongly indicated—or at least the
need for some correction to the administrative process of government with par-
ticular regard to the spending of public monies—one might draw the obvious
but completely erroneous conclusion that the several governors endowed with
this new power sat back with a sigh of relief, and disapproved millions of
dollars of waste, whether introduced by misguidance or by corrupt and repre^
hensible action on the part of the legislature. As a matter of fact, for many
years the item veto for appropriation bills lay dormant in just about every
state that adopted it, although there were, cf course, exceptions. The de-
velopment of the item veto proceeded at uneven rates of speed and with varying
results from state to state. In New York, for example, the item veto was added
to the state constitution in 1874, but its first use was by Governor Samuel J.
Tilden in 1895, Similarly, in Nebraska, which adopted it in 1875, the first
use was in 1895, and during the entire period 1875-1915, the average value of
the few applications of the item veto was only $11,100. It seemed almost as
if the executive was afraid to flex his muscles lest he cause destruction and
chaos in the budgetary process. But the use did develop together with certain
Alexander, 0£. jcit. , p. 197.
2
Knute E. Carlson, "The ExerollO of the Veto Power in Nebraska,"
Nebraska History and Political Science Series , Bulletin No, 12 (Lincoln, Nebr.:
Kline-Smith Publishing Company, 1917), p, 11.
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significant changes in emphasis. The table below shows the extent to which
the item veto was applied in two recent years; omission of a state which has
the provision in its constitution indicates that for the years indicated the
item veto was not used.
3
EXERCISE OF TBE ITEM VETO , 1945 AND 1947
1945 1947
State or Bills Item Number Amount in
Tprritnry Vetoed of Iteffis $1000*s Bills Items Amounts
1 80.0
4 64.1
50 465.8 3 9 40.6
2 6,067.7 8 8 16,010.9
96 4,544.7 3 24 2,648.6
5
1
6 48,315. 0(a) 5 45 10,862.8
3 62.0 1 7 18.8
3 22.5
33 18,802.2 13 17 7,838.3
5 57.0 1 8 115.3
4 350.8
34 10,322.1 2 22 100.1

























89,431.7 42TOTALS 55 266 105 38,182.8
(a) Represents a transfer of $48,000,000 to certain funds "vetoed and disal-
lowed". Missouri figures are given for 1945-6 and 1947-8.
Some idea of the relative magnitude of the items vetoed to the total appropria
tion bill is given by the knowledge that the above figures, except for the
$48,000,000 figure for Missouri, represent from one to three percent of the
total state budget in most cases. Some states obviously used the method
extensively, as in the case of Pennsylvania; others, such as Kansas and Texas,
3
Frank W. Prescott, "The Executive Veto in American States," The
















just as obviously use the veto for the purpose originally conceived--that of
eliminating a single item or a few items of illegal or unwrranted appropria-
tions.
This shift of emphasis of use from that of merely eliminating partic-
ular items for specific reasons to that of using the item veto as a definitely
vital part of state budgetary control is interesting and of considerable im-
portance. In some states in particular this action has been true. Pennsyl-
vaniat Massachusetts, and California are the prime examples, though other
states follow to a lesser degree. These three states even go further by per-
mitting the executive to reduce as well as eliminate items. The Territory of
Bawaii also uses the item veto as a tool to achieve economy. This shift,
according to Arthur Holcomb,
resulted from increasing costs of government but mainly from extrava-
gant habits of legislatures and their failure to assume full responsi-
bility for living within revenues. In New York, in 1910, the item
veto made thirteen times as many reductions as the upper house over
the lower; and in 1914 $7,27ii,000 or 15% reduction occurred by item
vet0,5
The obvious move then on the part of the legislatures was to try to avoid
wholesale use of the item veto by improper itemization. This lump-sum approach
to appropriation bills, when used by an irresponsible legislature, put an even
further burden on the executive, by combining the good with the bad. In this
game of "who is highest on the totem pole*', the executives in many states
attacked the lump-sum appropriation, when necessary to reduce the budget to
within revenue figures, by reducing specific items as well as, or in lieu oft
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main importance because the attempt succeeded, whereas, by court action in
other cases, the attempt failed.
In 1885 the Governor of Pennsylvania first reduced a single item in
an appropriation bill without eliminating it. The practice was continued for
fifteen years, until in 1901 the matter of constitutionality was tested."
The facts of the case were as follows:
In the general appropriation bill of 1899, there was one item ap-
propriating $11,000,000 to the public schools of the state. The
Governor vetoed $1,000,000 of this item and approved the remaining
$10,000,000. In sanctioning the reduction, the court was compel-
led to place a strained interpretation upon the item veto provision
in the state constitution. Apparently, the judges feared that a
contrary decision would invalidate the entire amount; they were
also influenced by the argument from prescription since the prac-
tice had been used for 15 years without being challenged in the
courts.^
Pennsylvania has, accordingly, used the power to reduce as well as to veto
items ever since as an integral part of its budgetary process. Other states
were not so successful; tests of constitutionality of the power to reduce were
made in Texas, Illinois, Arizona, Oklahoma, Montana and Colorado, and the
Governor was denied the right to reduce.
It is evident therefore that although the chief executives were slow
in most cases to exercise their new prerogative of the item veto in those
states adopting it, either from lack of knowledge of Just how to apply it or
from an understandable hesitancy to use a scalpel that could well turn into a
^Commonwealth v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161 (1901)*^
7
Wells, 0£. cit .. p. 784,n.
^Fulmore v. Une, 104 Texas 499 (1911); Fergus V. Russel, 270 111. 304
(1915); Fairfield v. Foster, 25 Ariz. 146 (1923); Publy v. Childers, 95 Okla.
40 (1923); Mills v. Porter, 69 Mont. 325 (1924); Strong v. People, ex rel.
Curran, 74 Colo. 283 (1925). For a more complete discussion of this point, and
references to additional court cases, see V. L. W., 0£. cit ., pp. 130-33.
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two edged sword in paring appropriations of unwarranted or excess fat, most of
them gained confidence after delayed initial attempts of using the item veto.
Some tried to extend its power by using it to reduce items; most failed to
have this action upheld. As the item veto increased in use and--with the
executives at least
—
popularity, the reasons for its use changed to a marked
degree. Probably the peak came in the 192U*s; since that time it has been
less drastically invoked. It still retains a measure cf popularity which
Q
Prescott terms "a gun behind the door,' But he also observes that
notwithstanding the attitudes of a few critics, and the advance of
more modern devices of fiscal control, the usefulness of the item
veto as a reserve weapon is evidenced by the number of proposals
which have been made to adopt it in Indiana, New Hampshire, Iowa,
Tennessee and Rhode Island. -^-^
There are two points worthy of further investigation in Prescott *s
comment. One is the note of advances in the field of fiscal control, and the
other, closely allied to it, is the reference to the item veto as a "reserve
weapon." Study of these points properly falls into the subject matter of
the following chapter.
9









EFFECT OF BUDGET REFORMS
With the rise of supply of government services, with or without demand,
in the last half of the nineteenth century and to an even greater extent in
the first half of the twentieth century-~<although admittedly the state govern-
ments can hardly compete with the federal government on this score—-it became
more and more important that the taxpayers* dollars be spent wisely and for
the common welfare of all citizens. The item veto came out of a growing reali-
zation that some sort of check was needed for an irresponsible—or even a
responsible—•legislature. In the latter case one might better term it some
sort of "adequate fiscal management** than "check", but the basic principle
remains the same. To spend dollars wisely and well, correctly and efficiently,
a better system than that in use from the inception of the Union became ur<»
gently needed. Note of this in the federal budget process was taken by the
Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency in 1912. It is to be regretted that
because of political differences there was a delay of nine years before the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 started a long overdue budget reform for
the federal government. The first recommendation of the Taft Commission was
for a comprehensive Executive Budget covering both expenditures and revenues,
including the consequences of new legislation. This step was the keystone of
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an increasingly complex problem.
The same thinking existed about this time in the minds of those con-
cerned with state expenditures. The school of budget reformers, beginning
particularly in New York about 1915t believed that the item veto and reduction
method was a reversal of proper procedure. The method left the legislature
sending proposed expenditure authorizations to the executive, rather than vice-
versa, for final approval. It was illogical and ineffective as applied to
appropriation bills. The item veto could prevent additions to the executive
budget, but in those few cases in which such a budget existed, there was nor-
mally neglected the prohibition against the legislature's raising the amounts
recommended by the executive, so that unless reduction authority was granted
him he was powerless to carry out a sound and economical program,'^ When a
legislature oarried to an extreme the process of adding greatly to the execu-
tive's recommended expenditure program, and sent back a budget swollen out of
all proportion to the expected revenues, the executive was placed in a position
of having an entirely different budget sent to him for approval and, to the
extent that his powers of item veto. or other authority permitted, modification
as required to meet revenue limitations.
There was an additional complication. With few exceptions, and those
mostly of a special or emergency nature, appropriation bills were placed on
the executive's desk at the very close of session, and the legislature ad-
journed. There are different provisions in the several states as regards the
length of time the' executive has to act on bills in such circumstances, before
Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States . (New Yorl
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951), pp. 68-71.
2
Alexander, 0£, cit . > p. 216.
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they are automatically dead via the "pocket-veto" method. Usually this time
is thirty days, but in some cases it is less. There is hardly time therefore
for the executive to act with care and thoroughness in this review. Further-
moret if he did exercise his veto, item or whole, the bill was effectively
vetoed absolutely, since the legislature had adjourned, and without a special
session there could be no repassage of the bill over the veto. A measure so
important as to call for a special session would almost certainly not have
been vetoed in the first place, or, if there was any doubt in the matter,
wouldhave been presented earlier to guard against such a contingency. The
veto in such cases was therefore essentially absolute, without reconsidera-
tion or adequate expression of public opinion.
Of course, the executive could take longer than the constitutionally
allotted time in his review, and probably all would be well, but all might
just as likely not be well and then chaotic conditions could easily result.
Such a situation occurred in Connecticut in 1929. The State Supreme Court
set aside an act as unconstitutional because the Governor signed it more than
three days after its passage, whereas the constitution required that to become
law it must be signed within three days. With the stroke of the judicial pen,
1493 Acts were rendered unconstitutional. Acts that had been passed over the
four preceding administrations as well as the current one.
Wells opined that the item veto alone is not sufficient. There was
needed a complete budget reform, of which the executive budget was a funda-
mental part, and a prohibition against legislative increases to it also should
*!*, Brooke Graves, American State Government . 4th ed, {Boston: D. C.
Heath & Co., 1953), p. 281. An excellent review of the budget reforms may be
found in Austin F. MacDonald, American State Government and Administration ,
(New York: Thomas Y, Crowell Company, 1951), pp. 389-98.
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be made a part of the procedure. He did admit that one solution was to adopt
the executive budget, not prohibit the legislature's increases, and give the
executive the power to reduce items. The step was not objectionable "provided
it is made an integral part of an adequate executive budget plan and not, as
in Pennsylvania, an isolated and irresponsible instrument of financial con-
trol." He considered most important the obvious but normally unobserved
requirement of a good budget system that the budget, as passed by the legis-
lature, must be enacted before the end of the session, so that the veto is
suspensive, not final, in fact.^
The budget reforms introduced into almost every state are logically
divided into three groups. The first group, of thirty-one states, undertook
reform by legislative action which did not change the constitutional provisions
of the item veto, but which could change the actual operation of it. (Louisi-
anat though its reform was by amendment to the state constitution, belongs in
this group.) The second group, ifaryland. West Virginia, and Nebraska,made
reforms by constitutional amendment which curtailed the item veto provision.
The third group, Massachusetts and California, also made constitutional amend-
ments, but enlarged the scope of the item veto.
Of the foregoing, study of the first group shows that the item veto
could be affected in two ways. If law requires an executive budget, the Gov-
ernor is encouraged to use the item veto against legislative additions. For
increases he would need power to reduce as well as to eliminate items, which
as has been mentioned, may or may not be objectionable depending on how it is
4
Wells, 0£, cit, , p, 787,
^Ibid.
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applied. The second effect is that the reforms called for an earlier budget,
so that the item veto is more suspensive in actual practice, and not absolute
by force of circumstances. For example, in New York before the 1916 reform
under the budget reorganization act in that state, from 1899 to 1917 there
were 121 items vetoed before the legislature adjourned, and 1901 after. In
the period of eight years after reform, there were 391 before and only 7 after
adjournment. In 1917 in particular, there were 4 items repassed over the
Governor's veto, the first time that action had ever taken place in the state's
history of the item veto. A corollary advantage to the reform is that the
Governor has but ten days to act on a bill during sessions, but thirty days
after adjournment, so that earlier budget submission further increases the
mere suspensive nature of the item veto.
In the second group of states* Maryland is of chief interest. The 1916
Act in that state has the effect of putting the item veto in the legislature
rather than in the executive. The legislature is permitted only to strike out
or reduce items in the budget the executive submits. The bill then becomes
law without further action by the Governor. Special measures initiated by the
legislature are possible, but the Governor has the right to veto them. Since
the budget bill is the only one likely to contain itemized appropriations, and
since the Governor may not disapprove it in whole or in part (he would hardly
want to since he prepared it in the first place), the item veto is essentially
obsolete. The contingency is very remote that a special bill would contain
more than one item, yet contain only one item in it objectionable to the Gov-
ernor to the extent that he would want to employ the item veto. If the item
veto were not already a part of his powers he would in all probability find no
reason to ask for it. A similar situation exists in West Virginia, although
l-^
iOii DilJ J.:
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there is the difference that the budget is prepared by the Governor in concert
with six elected officers constituting a board for the purpose. Of course, one
can conclude that the item veto is still the **gun behind the door** mentioned by
Prescott and that as such it is an essential and integral part of the machinery
of the budget process. Wells so believes.
Massachusetts and California^ in the third group, have a more moderate
approach. Massachusetts, by amendment of 1910, assigned the executive the
responsibility of submitting the budget. There may be no special appropria-
tion bills until the general bill has passed unless the executive so recommends
The general court has full power to increase, decrease, add, or omit items in
the budget, while the executive is authorized to disapprove or reduce items or
parts of items in any bill appropriating money. The item veto therefore intro-
duced a budgetary procedure reminiscent of the Confederate system. In prac-
tice, during the six years first following the amendment, the executive budget
seldom had items increased or added, and it never increased as a whole. The
it«Q veto was not often used when items were added by the legislature, though
some few cases did arise. Wells states:
On the whole, the Massachusetts budget system has been a suc-
cess. The governor has done careful work in revising and reducing
the original departmental estimates sent to him. On receiving the
budget the general court has carried the reduction process still
further so that there was little occasion to use the veto power on
the appropriation bills as they were passed by the two houses. Al-
though the estimates submitted are only tentative and might be al-
tered beyond recognition by the legislature, this has not happened,
for that body through its committees has handled the budget in an
efficient manner. Were this not the case, the governor would prob-
ably have made a more extensive use of his veto power than was done.
^Ibid .
^Ibid., p. 790.
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Of course, the item veto would have a definite place in such a system were
there to develop conflict between the governor and his lawmaking body. Such a
conflict did develop in California, the only state which (in 1922) copied the
Massachusetts plan. The governor won out, after a hard fight in the lower
house, by using and having sustained his veto and reduction of items which had
been added by the legislature to the extent that the appropriations exceeded
the estimate revenues by some two percent. But this was an unusual case.
From the experience shown by Massachusetts and California, it appears
that it is not necessary to limit the legislature's power to the extent that
Maryland has done to obtain a good budgetary system. Nor does it appear that
the item veto must necessarily be the whiplash that many fear it might be in





The previous chapters have indicated the realization for the need of
the item veto in the appropriation bill, the adoption by over three-quarters of
the states of the item veto in varying forms, the manner of its use by the
states, the attempts, in part successful, of the chief executives to extend the
application of the item veto to reductions as well as eliminations, and more
recently the partial abnegation of the power by reason of different budgetary
procedures than were in use at the time of introduction of the item veto. The
picture is seemingly a bright one without a cloud in the sky. But there are
drawbacks, as one might well expect. Before closing the study of the item veto
as used by the states, it is necessary to inquire further into the disadvan-
tages that arise as well as the advantages.
The original reason for introducing the item veto was to enable the
chisf executive to remove from a bill embracing many items for which money was
appropriated such few as were illegal, or unwarranted, or unduly extravagant,
or aided the few at the expense of the many. In theory, the legislatures would
continue to perform as before, and those few instances in which disapproval of
an item was merited and yet the entire act should not in the public interest
be vetoed could be purged by means of the item veto. In fact the result in
many cases was that the legislatures shirked their duties even more than before.
They looked to the executives to straighten out the legislatures* own mistakes




too high and exceeded revenues, let the executives take action to reduce them
sufficiently. In 1896 Governor Tilden of New York in bis annual message to the
state legislature expressed concern at the responsibility which devolved on
the governor, and the disposition to hold him to the extreme of accountability
in respect to appropriations. Thus "buck-passing** was encouraged. Michigan
hardly fared better. John Perkins in his study of appropriation enactment in
that state observed:
this fitem veto] arrangement may encourage an extravagant policy on
the part of lawmakers and thrusts upon the executive the onerous task
of keeping the state solvent or accepting responsibility for the fail-
ure to do so,^
It is, of course, hindsight to say that such should have been expected to some
degree. And yet it is a recognized human tendency to take less pains with a
task assigned when one knows it will be reviewed and in all probability modi-
fied. In this particular case the reviewer has neither recourse nor redress—
if we except appeal to public opinion—against those failing in their duties.
Not only has extravagance on the part of the legislature been intro-
duced, but it has been augmented by a new evil. Legislators have been en-
couraged
to please their constituents by voting for appropriations far in
excess of anticipated revenues thus forcing the governor to make
the inevitable reductions and incur the wrath of the individuals
adversely affected,*^
It is easy to see that if the governor and the legislature are of different
Alexander, 0£, ci_t
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political parties, the latter can put the former in an embarrassingly difficult
situation. A tool for administrative efficiency has been twisted and reshaped
into a political bludgeon.
The defects and dangers of the item veto do not lie entirely on the side
of the legislature. The fact that this power "offers a spearhead of leadership
and permits the governor to become a determining force in the process of ap-
propriation" may be a bit too much of a good thing. An unscrupulous executive
could easily use the threat of eliminating local projects of interest tc those
legislators who might be inclined to vote against his programs to force them
into line with his wishes. There appears to be a fair balance and division of
power between the executive and the legislative branches with the whole veto;
the item veto added, even without the power to reduce items, would appear to
throw the balance on the side of the executive. To do so is hardly in line
with American practice or wishes. Margaret Alexander puts it quite strongly:
But the power to veto items in appropriation bills . . . has given
the state executive an absolute authority in fiscal legislation
which is surely subversive of the Anglo-Saxon principle that in the
legislature should rest the control of the purse.
^
Furthermore, as has been pointed out previously, most appropriation bills are
placed on the executive's desk at the end of session. With the legislature ad-
Journed, a veto by the executive is in fact absolute, rather than suspensive.
°
Even if the veto of an item of particular interest to a local district or city
occurred during the session, it is rather doubtful that the single legislator
4
Perkins, 0£. cit ., p. 52.
5
Alexander, 0£. cit., p. 198.
6
M. Nelson McGreary, "The Governor's Veto in Pennsylvania," The American
Political Science Review
.
XLI (October, 1947), p. 946.
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could muster the two-thirds majority to repass an item of but small interest to
most of his fellows. It could, in its simplest form, be used to reward or
punish members of the legislature through the approval or disapproval of local
projects, be they honest or "pork barrel*' type.
The use of the item veto in Pennsylvania has been extensive, but not
altogether commendatory. "Probably in no state in the Union has the veto been
a more effective club in the hands of the governor than in Pennsylvania."
The introduction of items for political reasons, the tendency of the legis-
lature to avoid its responsibilities, the effectively absolute veto given the
governor by the frequent, even normal practice of depositing the general ap-
propriation bill on the governor's desk at the end of the session, all these
defects and others occurred. And the veto, even when it came during the
session, so that there was ample time for the legislature to reconsider the
bill or item disapproved, was essentially absolute.
Even though a bill may have originally passed both houses by a
unanimous vote—as not infrequently happens—rarely is any effort
made to resurrect it. Only once in the period of this study [l939-
45} was a motion made to override a veto. The bill, which would
have amended the milk control law, had passed the house by a vote
of 200 to and the senate by 46 to 2. The governor's veto was sus-
tained in the house, however, by a vote, on the motion to override,
of 115 yeas to 75 nays.°
It is easy to see that the extension of the veto power to include the
item veto, when it is so effective a death-blow to legislation of unanimously
agreed merit, can mako the governor a political despot. Unfortunately for the
story of state government in the United States, that is what has at times
occurred. A startling indication of the potency of executive control by use
'
^Ibid .. p. 941.
^Ibid .. pp. 944-45.
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of the item veto was evidenced by the Pennsylvania biennial appropriation bill
of 1941. The house voted 17% less funds for the Department of Commerce than
the governor had recommended in his budget. Governor James, Republican, re-
taliated by reducing the appropriations for both the Department of the Auditor-
General and the Treasury to points 17% below his budget suggestions. These
were the only two departments headed by Democrats.^








ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE, 1876-1949
Almost since the day the first state introduced the item veto into its
constitution there have been moves to do likewise for the federal government.
Presidents, senators, representatives and writers in the field of political
science have recommended, requested, even pleaded for this extension of the
Chief Executive's power. The first congressional attempt to initiate an
amendment to the Constitution was made by Mr. Faulkner of West Virginia on
18 January 1876. In nearly every succeeding congress the proposal has been
reintroduced in varying forms. At least eighty such amendments were introduced
2between 1876 and 1936, and a number have been introduced subsequently. They
were varied in nature, scope and detail. Some applied to all appropriation
bills; some to rivers and harbors only—a point of considerable contention be-
cause of the obvious possibilities for *'pork barrel*' projects and "log-rolling"
—some required majority vote of both houses to override; others the usual
two-thirds vote.
Whether Representative Faulkner's attempt was prompted by his own ideas
on the subject or by the earlier message of President Grant it is difficult to
say. The President, in his fifth annual message for the preceding Congress,
United States, Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st Session, 1875,
IV, Part 1, 477.
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1 December 1873, suggested two measures for improvements in the Constitution,
The first of these was the item veto provision. He suggested that Congress
authorize the Executive to approve of so much of any measure passing
the two Houses of Congress as his judgment may dictate, without ap-
proving the whole, the disapproved portion or portions to be sub-
jected to the same rules as now, to wit, to be referred back to the
House in which the measure or measures originated, and, if passed
by a two-thirds vote of the two Houses, then to become a law without
the approval of the President."^
As is readily seen. Grant wanted the item veto in its most potent form-
not restricted to any type of bill whatsoever, as in the case of Washington
State. President Arthur was a little less demanding in the extent of his recom
mendations. In his second annual message of 4 December 1882, he coimnented on
the advisability of separating items in appropriating bills, as indicated by
the nature of certain rivers and harbors bills at the end of the previous ses-
sions which he had allowed to become law without signature, so that the Presi-
dent could have full opportunity of opposing objectionable appropriations
**wlthout imperiling the success of others which commended themselves to his
judgment.** He went on to say:
It is provided by the Constitution of fourteen of our states that
the executive may disapprove any item or items of a bill appropriating
money; whereupon the part of the bill approved shall be law, and the
part disapproved shall fail to become law, unless repassed according
to the provisions prescribed for the passage of bills over the veto
of the executive.. . . I commend to your careful consideration the
question whether an amendment of the Federal Constitution in the
particular indicated would not afford the best remedy for what is
often grave embarrassment both to the members of the Congress and to
the Executive, and is sometimes a serious public mischief.^
3
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Dndoubtedly his ire had been aroused by the appropriation act sent him for
signature just a few months earlier. This act, one for rivers and harbors,
he vetoed 1 August 1682 and returned it to the Congress with these reasons
therefor:
My principal objection to the bill is that it contains appropria-
tions for purposes not for the common defense or general welfare, and
which do not promote commerce among the States. These provisions, on
the contrary, are entirely for the benefit of the particular locali-
ties in which it is proposed to make the improvements. I regard such
appropriation of the public money as beyond the povjers given by the
Constitution to the Congress and the President.
I feel the more bound to withhold my signature from the bill be-
cause of the peculiar evils which manifestly result from this in-
fraction of the Constitution. Appropriations of this nature, to be
devoted purely to local objects, tend to an increase in number and in
amount. As the citizens of one State find that money, to raise which
they in common with the whole country are taxed, is to be expended
for local improvements in another State, they demand similar bene-
fits for themselves, and it is not unnatural that they should seek
to indemnify themselves for such use of the public funds by securing
appropriations for similar improvements in their own neighborhood.
Thus as the bill becomes more objectionable it secures more support.
This result is invariable and necessarily follows a neglect to ob-
,
serve the constitutional limitations imposed upon the lawmaking power.
It is particularly interesting to note that at no time during the initial
attempts to introduce the item veto was the reason given that it could be used
to help keep expenditures, or authorizations to make them, within revenues.
Indeed, the very same message in which President Arthur asks for the item veto
contains a few paragraphs earlier the request for tax reductions to the extent
of abolition of all internal revenue taxes except those in liquor, since he
believed in the doctrine
that only such taxes ought to be levied as are necessary for a wise
and economical administration of the government. Of late the public
ii
Ibid ., p. 121. Cf. President Hayes* veto message on the Army appropri-
ations bill, 29 April 1879, VII, 528-29; President Cleveland's fourth annual
message, 3 December, 1888, VIII, 778; and President Harrison's message of 17
February, 1892, regarding the Indian appropriation bill, IX, 229.
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revenues have far exceeded that limit. For the fiscal year ended
June 30, 1881, the surplus revenue amounted to $100,000,000.'
The Presidents found those willing to listen, and to introduce reso-
lutions in the House or the Senate as the initial step toward effecting an
amendment to the Constitution. Mr. Faulkner has already been mentioned as the
first, with his introduction of House Joint Resolution 45. Others followed
soon thereafter. In the 46th Congress, S.R. 4 and S.R. 21 were introduced;
both were adversely reported. One senator did not agree with the report, but
o
nothing further came of the matter. In the 47th Congress occurred the only
time in either house that the question of the item veto came to a vote, and
then only as a vote on a motion to suspend the rules and discharge the reso«-
lution from committee and pass it. This action occurred in 1883. Mr. Flower,
proponent of the resolution, made the motion to suspend the rules. His motion
failed by five votes to secure the necessary two-thirds majority, by 101 ayes
and 58 noes.
The only time the Judiciary Committee of either house reported favorably
on a resolution for the item veto occurred in the following Congress. There
were three resolutions in the Senate concerned with the matter; S. B. 8 and
S, R. 22 were reported by the committee with a request for discharge of further
responsibility since S. R. 18 was on the same subject, was favorably reported,
and was on the Calendar; hence those two resolutions were indefinitely post-
poned. S. R. 18 had been introduced by Mr. Lapham of New York on 6 December
•^Ibid. , VIII, 134.
Q
United States, Congressional Record
.
46th Congress, 2nd session, 1879,
X, Part 1, 751.
9
Ibid., 47th Congress, 2nd session, 1883. XIV, Part 3, 2137; Part 4, 361
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1883, and referred to the Judiciary Committee. It was reported back with
amendment on 21 April, 1884. It first came to the floor of the Senate on
9 December, 1884, and was postponed until 17 December, on which latter date it
was again postponed until 9 February, 1885, and finally further postponed until
19 February. On 19 February it was not brought to a vote, and nothing further
was heard on the matter. The next Congress went back to the usual story—
the resolution was reported unfavorably by the Judiciary Committee,
In more recent years the same thing has occurred. In 1936 the late
Senator Vandenburg of Michigan introduced Senate Joint Resolution 281 on 3 June
before the 74th Congress. Nothing happened other than the usual referral to
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The Senator was a strong proponent
of the item veto for many years«and made several attempts on what might almost
be termed his pet project. He appealed to public opinion in an article in
The Saturday Evening Post in 1936 in which he made several statements that
have by now to readers of this paper a familiar ring:
The only new authority created would be a negative authority to
stop expenditures. ... It is a change that . . . would increase
the efficiency of administration and contribute to the possibility
of wiser, safer, and less burdensome government. -^^
The Senator referred to the use of the item veto in thirty-nine of the states
and then concluded that
IMl-' 4Q^h Conyr., 1st Session, 1883, XV, Part 1, 48; 1884, XV,
Part 4, 3164; Part 5, 4267; 2nd Session, 1884, XVI, Part 1, 104, 304; 1885,
XVI, Part 2, 1492; Part 3, 1876.
^^Ibid .. 49th Congr., 1st Session, 1886, XVII, Part 4, 3735. The full
report is found in House Report 1879, 49th Congress, 1st Session, quoted infra .
P-53.
^^Arthur H. Vandenburg, U. S. Senator from Michigan, "Hash by the
Billion!", Saturday Evening Post
. CCIX (29 August, 1936), p. 10.
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the national need is the greater in degree because the national ap-
propriations are infinitely larger and more remote from the neiah-
borly disciplines which exist in the lesser governmental units. ^^
He described the times that President Wilson had called Congress* bluff
on three separate occasions by vetoing appropriation bills because they con-
tained items to which he strongly objected but which he could not veto without
disapproving the entire bills; one of these times was but three days before the
end of session. Congress corrected the bills. But certainly there was a risk
run that the orderly course of government business would be greatly upset had
Congress not amended the bills and had stood adjourned.
Senator Vandenburg believed that the item veto supplemented the execu-
tive budget.
The same sound reasoning which supports an executive budget to curb
federal expenditures in advance of congressional appropriations should
support the item veto if and when the congressional appropriations
subsequently ravish the budget. One supplements the other. Without
the item veto the budget may too easily become an impotent wooden gun.^"^
The Senator was not alone in his attempts at that time. Representatives
Dirksen Hllinois), Citron (Connecticut) and Luckey (Nebraska) submitted House
Joint Resolutions 622, 352 and 623 on 8 June, 30 March and 3 June, 1936, re-
spectively. Senator Vandenburg*s and Mr. Dirksen's resolutions called for
acceptance or rejection of items in general appropriation bills; Mr. Citron's
for distinct items; and Mr. Luckey*s for items in any appropriation bill. The
last two would also have permitted reduction of items. All died in committee.
Senator Vandenburg made further attempts to introduce the item veto,
either by constitutional amendment or by appropriate legislation in each ap-
^^Ibid.
^"^
Ibid .. p. 11.
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proprlation bill. On 10 March, 1942, he stated that two years before he had
proposed a constitutional amendment to provide for the item veto for appropri-
ation bills but that his proposal still lay in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
He inserted in the record a letter from President Roosevelt which contained
the opinion that he, the President, thought that legislation would suffice,
and that he would like to see the item veto power rest with the President.
Shortly thereafter, however, he withdrew his opinion concerning there being
no need for a constitutional amendment. He stated that he had had a very com-
plete legal study made since March and no longer thought that legislation
16
would be a satisfactory and legal manner to introduce the item veto.
Various writers in the political science field have written in favor of
the item veto. Perhaps foremost among them is Louis Brownlow in his study of
the Presidency. He delivered a series of six lectures at the University of
Chicago in 1947, under the sponsorship of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation;
the sixth of these was entitled "What Help Does the President Need From Us?'*
and contained the following opinion:
We should today give the President of the United States this same
power [as in the Constitution of the Confederate States of America]
of veto over specific items in the supply bills. Without this power,
the President often feels compelled to sign supply bills despite their
freight of obnoxious items and legislative riders rather than risk
the stoppage of whole governmental departments for want of funds. Not
infrequently the President feels impelled to announce to the public
that he has signed an appropriation bill with reluctance because it
contained specific items which he deemed bad, but which he could not
veto without vetoing the entire measure.
To give the President this power of item veto would not make him
a ''Dictator." It would help him more faithfully to reflect the v;ill
of the people. And, of course, if he misused the power, the item
15United States, Congressional Record , 77th Congress, 2nd session,
1942, LXXXVIII, Part 2, 2153.
^^Ibid., Part 3, 3670, 3694.
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could be repassed over his objection if it could muster a two-thirds
vote in both houses of the Congress, just as if he vetoes an entire
bill.
In no fewer than thirty-nine of the forty-eight states of the
Union the people have given the Governor of the state this power to
veto specific items in appropriation bills. In some of the states
this power has been extended so that the Governor may approve, dis-
approve or modify specific items. ^'
In the last fifteen years the size of the federal budget has grown
beyond all belief of those who used as their main argument for the item veto
the tremendous, to them then, amounts of government expenditures. If one of
the leading arguments for increasing the executive's power to eliminate costly,
unneeded items in order to achieve economies was the size of the budget,
surely then attempts in the past few years should have bad success. The
next chapter shows what success.
17
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ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE 1950-1954
In recent years there have been two attempts to introduce the item
veto. One of these was, again, as a resolution in the House to amend the
Constitution, although the sponsor also submitted a proposed bill which would
by statute accomplish the same end, provided the statute was not considered
or found subsequently unconstitutional. The other was as a part of a bill
for modifying the budgetary process of the federal government.
On 3 January, 1951, Representative Keating of New York introduced be-
fore the House of Representatives, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, a bill and a
resolution. The bill, H. R. 492, was referred to the Expenditures Committee
and the resolution, H. J. R. 24, to the Judiciary Conaaittee. The latter is
not heard of again. But hearings were held on the former by the Committee on
Expenditures in Executive Departments, on evaluation of the effect of laws
enacted to reorganize the legislative branch of the government. Representative
Keating appeared before the Committee 19 June, 1951. In his prepared state-
ment he said:
Presidents Grant, Hayes, Taft and Roosevelt, and perhaps other
Presidents, have requested Congress to empower them to disapprove
particular items in appropriation bills without being forced to veto
the entire measure and run the risk of depriving a government depart-
ment of the power to function by withholding funds completely.
When I first advanced the legislative suggestion of permitting
the President to veto individual items in an appropriation bill it
was in connection with the omnibus approach of providing funds. . . .
I concede that the importance of the item veto is much greater in
such a case, but this legislation still seems desireable to me if
41
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we continue to use the present system of separate departmental
funds bills. . . . Particularly with regard to bills dealing with
public works I feel this approach would be extremely salutory.
The opposition to this legislation may be voiced that it
centers too great a power in the President. Any step to enlarge
Executive authority is certain to be viewed, and very properly,
with some skepticism.. . . Particularly in the field of appropria-
tions the Congress has historically been reluctant to yield any
part of its control over governmental operations. . . . Right at
this critical moment, it seems to me, the most constructive service
we could render would be to adopt every reasonable suggestion ad-
vanced to cut down the cost of running the Government.^
In additional oral testimony Representative Keating added the following ob-
servations and replies to questions put to him:
Mr. Keating . I am going to assume that we are all sincerely worried
about the financial picture and are trying to devise methods of a-
chieving real economy, ... It may be a little unusual for a Repub-
lican Congressman to be suggesting that our present Chief Executive
... be given every tool that he needs. If we are going to criti-
cize him for spending too much money, then we should give him all
the possible tools he could possibly use to cut down on government
spending.
Senator Hoey . Congressman, I have the idea that the legislative branch
would be rather loath to give the President that power which this bill
contemplates. . . . Nov^, if the President is going to have the right to
strike out the one [appropriation] he does not want and take the others,
then I think that the legislative body is surrendering a great deal of
its privileges and a good deal of its rights. I can see a great many
instances and a great many matters where the legislative branch would
not want to surrender those rights and have it all supervised by him
so that he can pick out what he wanted. Those remarks apply particu-
larly to appropriation bills.
Mr. Keatincj . You appreciate, Senator, that this is limited to appro-
priations.
Senator Hoey . Yes, but the Chairman [senator McClellan] did point out
the possibility of having it applied to legislative bills generally.^
Here, then, is again the old story—the hopes by the proponent of the item veto
tliat it will serve to eliminate the "pork barrel** to reduce costs of the budget
United States, Congress, Senate, Conmiittee on Expenditures in Executive
Departments, Hearings. Organization and Operation of Congress . 82nd Congress,




-jji ^L''A) ,iJii:it.\. j-tJ^.i
aiixa a^ijX-'.ci_-ji oj L'Aj'i.i- li „:
! Otij—Y' ^ dd^ ,n9iit ,91
43
as a whole (Mr. Keating did not propose that the authority to reduce items be
given), to remove any possible excuse the President might have that the Con-
gress had put him in a position of being unable properly to discharge his
responsibilities; the fears of the opponent that the Chief Executive will
extend his power, will take away the rights and privileges of the Congress
(it is interesting that Senator Hoey avoids the word "responsibilities"),
will acquire overwhelming power. Needless to say, nothing further was heard
of Congressman Keating*s proposal.
So acted the Senate. Representative Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., of
New York, had the previous year introduced before the 81st Congress, 2d Session
a bill to supplement the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 by providing for a
balanced budget in an expanding economy, long-range budget estimates, a Presi-
dential item veto, a consolidated cash budget, an investment budget, and a
four'-year appropriation for major investment programs. This bill was numbered
H, R. 8084; it was referred to the House Committee on Expenditures in Execu-
tive Departments; and hearings were held 8 and 18 June, 1950. Section 4 of
H. R. 8084 stated:
4 (a) Every appropriation bill reported to the House of Representatives
or the Senate shall contain a section which shall read as follows:
"When this bill shall have passed the House of Representatives and
Senate and shall have been presented to the President for his approval,
the President shall have the power to disapprove any item or items con-
tained in this bill, in the same manner and subject to the same limi-
tations as he may, under Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of the
United States, disapprove as a whole any bill which shall have been pre-
sented to him for his approval. The provisions of sectioi 7 which shall
relate to reconsideration shall also apply to any item or items so dis-
approved to the same extent as they apply to a bill that has been dis-
approved by the President.
4 (b) Subsection (a) is enacted by the Congress as an exercise of
the rule-making power of the Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, and as such it shall be considered as a part of the rules
of each House, respectively; such rule shall supersede other rules
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tion is enacted with full recognition of the constitutional right of
either House to change such rule (so far as relating to the procedure
in such House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent
as in the case of any other rule of such House.
Mr. Roosevelt's statement at the time of introduction of his bill is worth
noting if mainly only to show that the situation hadn*t changed much since Mr.
Faulkner's day. Kr. Roosevelt said, with regard to the cry for economy and
appropriation cuts:
But suppose you take the trouble to ask the next questions, "Where
are the cuts to be made?" and 'Tslho is to do the cutting?" You are then
told the cuts are to be made "everywhere" and the "President" is to
make the cuts. This is sheer political mumbo-jumbo. Perhaps there
are some agencies that are getting more than they need. Any business
the size of the Federal establishment has problems of efficient and
economic operations. But to talk about using a budgetary guillotine
on every agency to the same degree is arrogant nonsense and it is time
we said so.
The Appropriation Committees . , . discuss large reductions in
broad areas of the budget without at any point naming appropriation
accounts which should be reduced or giving specific data as to pro-
grams which should be curtailed.
Passing the buck to the President makes no sense since he does
not have the power to reduce or eliminate items from the budget. . . .
The purpose of this bill is to begin the remodeling job by elim-
inating the following defects in the present budgetary practices of
the Federal government:
Third. The insertion of uneconomical or wasteful items in
appropriation bills.
The six sections of the bill provide practical remedies for these
defects. . . . Third, the President is given the power to veto indi-
vidual items in appropriation bills.
Incidentally, this power will have to be inserted in each year*s
appropriation bills. In this connection I was glad to note the day
before yesterday that our colleague, the gentleman from New York,
[Mr. Keating] Introduced a bill to achieve this particular purpose.^
3United States, House, Committee on Expenditures in Executive Depart-
ments, Hearinus on H. R. 8064 . entitled "Budgetary Practices Reorganization
Act of 1950 . "81st Cong., 2d Sess., June, 1950, p. 2. This wording was essen-
tially identical with that of Senator Vandengurg. Cf. U. S., Congressional
Record . 77th Congr., 2d Sess., 1942, LXXXVIII, Part 2, 2154.
United States, Congressional Record
. 81st Congr., 2d Sess., 1950, XCVI,
Part 4, 4926-29. Mr. Keating^s bill and resolution H.R. 8008 and H. J. R. 449,





Mr. Roosevelt gives as his reasons behind the third item of his bill, the pro-
vision for the item veto, the following:
Section 3 gives the President power to exercise his constitutional
power of veto over uneconomical or wasteful items inserted in appro-
priation bills.
One of the most wasteful practices in the Federal Government is
the Insertion in appropriation bills of individual items that cannot
be justified as legitimately serving the public interest. Sometimes
it is done through the most objectionable forms of log rolling. No
matter how it is done, it serves to squander priceless resources and
give people the unjustifiable impression that members of Congress
are more interested in slipping their hands into the pork barrel for
local projects than they are in serving the national interests.
The reason that so many of these little items get enacted and
the reason they add up to such large totals is that the President is
unable to veto individual items in an appropriation bill. He is
faced with the choice of either doing nothing about individual items
such as these or of vetoing a total measure and thus holding up opera-
tions for many other projects and activities that are vitally necess-
ary. He is invariably forced, therefore, to do nothing.
A number of years ago the Senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. Van-
denburgj proposed that this problem should be handled by giving item
veto powers to the President.
"Now we suddenly confront fabulous appropriation totals"—stated
the Senator from Michigan—"it seems more than ever necessary that
the Presidential veto should be afforded some degree of that same
discretion and selectivity with respect to the component parts of
an appropriation bill which Congress itself enjoys when it formu-
lates and passes these bills. . . . The governors of at least 40 out
of 48 states have the privileges of the item veto, and I have yet to
hear of a single instance in which its use has been contrary to the
public interest. ... I know of no reason why the President of the
United States should not have similar opportunity to desll effectively
with Federal appropriation bills. . . . Furthermore, an economy minded
President may easily be quite helpless in dealing with appropriations
if he is confined to a blanket *yes* or 'no* to the lump sum appro-
priation totals in the gigantic annual supply bills which now con-
front the country, and if he is forbidden to send back specific items
for congressional review."
Today when the Appropriations Committees in both Houses are plan-
ning to bring forth for the first time an omnibus appropriation bill
providing for the operations of the entire Government, item veto power
by the President becomes indispensable. Without it the multi-billion-
dollar omnibus appropriation bill may become a super pork-barrel mea-
sure that will frustrate all hopes of governmental economy.^
I \
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Representative Roosevelt disposed of the question of whether a statute or aa
amendment was necessary for the item veto provision by referring to Senator
Vandenburg's original thoughts on the question, and President Roosevelt's
opinion; he neglected to bring to the attention of the House the Senator's
subsequent testimony.
In the Hearings of H. R. 8084 the reaction was immediate and forceful.
(Mr. Roosevelt was actually a member of the conunittee which sat in hearings
on his bill.) The opening exchanges follow:
Ut. Rich . Who wrote this, bill?
Mr. Roosevelt . I wrote the bill.
Mr. Rich . I do not want any part of legislation of this kind. I
think it is about the most ridiculous piece of legislation I have
seen come before the House in a long time. . . . It is full of dyna-
mite.
The Chairman [Mr. Dawson] . I agree with you that it is full of
dynamite.
Mr. Rich . The President would be able to whip into line every
Congressman that he wanted to for votes on any particular thing
that he would like to have, just to show the individual member of
Congress that he can control him. . . . Never was a lash put over
Congress like this bill, if it were to be put into legislation.'
Mr. Roosevelt documented his presentation well. Letters were presented from
the Committee on Economic Development, the Committee of Economic Advisors to
the President, the Bureau of the Budget, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, and others all of whom endorsed the bill favorably, though
admittedly they had not very much to say on the subject of the item veto. But
numerous letters from various Senators and Representatives who had had exper-
ience in their states, many of them as Governors, with the item veto endorsed
the item veto favorably. Besides the correspondence on the subject, the cou-
Supra , p. 39, n. 16.
Hearings on Hj R . 8084. op . cit
.




mittee heard many witnesses, of whom only one spoke against the item veto, al-
though some doubted that Congress would have it. But the bill, which admittedl)
was almost as radical a change in many fundamentals of the budgetary process
8
as the original act of 1921, died in committee.
^Ibid.
, pp. 3. 7. 14, 22, 29, 36. 45, 59, 70. 83. 97-106. 107 ff.. 121.
Of particular interest is the testiEcny of Dr. George Gallcivay cf the Library
of Congress, pp. 59-60; it gives an excellent summary of the pros and cons of










The proponents of the item veto have spoken strongly for its intro-
duction into the federal government as an additional means for the President to
exercise his growing responsibilities with regard to the budget and appropri-
ated monies of the United States for public purposes. They have claimed many
advantages for the item veto^ and have cited its use in many states of the
Union. Their arguments for its use are based essentially on the following
accomplishments they believe it offers:
1. Reduce extravagance . It will enable the President to remove frou
the public monies appropriated for any specific items which in his opinion,
as the representative of the people as a whole, are either unwarranted, or
profligate or wantonly inconsiderate of the econongr of the country.
2. Discourage the "pork-^barrel ." It will permit the President to
eliminate from the appropriation bill single items which are of benefit to tlie
few at the expense of the many, but which the individual congressman would
hardly feel it politic to remove from, or fail to add to the appropriations
bill in view of his responsibilities to his constituents.
3. Eliminate " log-rolling ." The vicious practice whereby one or more
congressman agrees to work jointly to further the local interests of each by
making appropriated money available for specific projects in their own dis-
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4. Restore the veto in fact . Although there was never the intent by
the fraraers of the Constitution of the United States that any one bill would
cover more than a single subject or appropriation for more than a single major
function; and although there are rules of procedure in both the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Senate against riders and other manner of combining more
than one subject in a bill; there are nonetheless many occasions in which the
President finds on his desk for signature a bill of such importance that he
cannot fail to sign it, yet finds a completely extraneous and undesirable itaa
attached to it. In theory he has the power of veto; in fact he does not. The
item veto would restore his power in fact.
5» Expedite completion of the legislative process . At the present
time the President must return to Congress any bill which is vetoed stating his
reasons therefor. If the bill is passed over his veto, or if the bill is
amended or modified so as to be acceptable to the President, there is a delay
to the legislative process which may be of considerable magnitude. In the case
of pocket vetoes the delay continues until the next session of Congress. At
times desireable legislation may be stopped completely. VJere the President to
have the item veto power he could put into effect without delay so much of a
measure->->and this matter is of extreme importance as regards appropriations
bills, to which with hardly an exception the proponents of the item veto re-
strict their recommendations—-as seeo^ed to him in the best interests of the
people as a whole, and return the remainder for reconsideration.
6, The item veto has worked successfully in many states . The budgetary
processes of the state governments are similar to those of the federal govern-
ment and what works for one would undoubtedly work for the other.
The opponents of the item veto either do not admit to the foregoing
'A IIUAI' J'lju 19/;.,
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advantages claimed, or admit to them only in part, and state that the disad-
vantages far outweigh the advantages. They say that though it may have wori'ced
well in some states, it has worked poorly, even viciously, in others; and tliat
its defects, which are obvious to anyone who examines the experience of the
states* use, will be compounded in the wider field of federal use. Their
beliefs may be summarized in the following list of disadvantages:
1. Lessen Congressional responsibility . Congress would be encouraged
to **pass the buck**, disregarding their constitutionally assigned responsi-
bilities and leaving to the executive branch the problem of living within the
country's means, or deciding to resort to deficit financing. Congress would
be strongly encouraged to appropriate wildly and irresponsibly and then point
to the failure of the executive to take action to reduce expenditures.
2. Increase the influence of the executive . There is a definite fear,
similar to that which existed in the early days of the country, that the execu-
tive will become too strong, and the country will be led inexorably along the
path to dictatorship in fact, regardless of outward democratic appearances.
Any furtherance of the executive's power is a step that is taken by the legis-
lature with the greatest of reluctance and strongest of misgivings if it is
indeed taken at all. The item veto could be used by an unscrupulous or mis-
guided President to intrench himself in a position of overwhelming power by
using it to obtain his way in legislative matters. *To argue that a President
would not use such a 'stick' is to ignore the teachings of history**.
3. Destroy the system of checks and balances . At times the only way
in which the legislature has a countercheck against an obstinate executive who
V. L. W., 0£. cit.
,
p. 124.
KJ : c .





u cTi (f r •cr.
ui .

















is blocking the united action of the several representatives of the people Is
to place the executive in such a position that he cannot fail to approve a
measure which includes the item to which he separately objects but which he
cannot cut out of the measure and veto individually. To give the President
the item veto would destroy this balance.
4. Violate the principle of separation of powers . It would give the
executive a legislative function of correcting or "editing" the bills sent to
him for signature. Again, although the proponents of the item veto always are
careful to mention that it is a power to be given only as regards application
to appropriation bills, the opponents are just as careful to point out the
defects as applied to all bills; for they are wary of the extension of the
power on one pretext or another that the bill is, directly or indirectly, an
appropriation bill. There is a further difficulty, referred to in the next
paragraph.
5. Uncertain grant of power . The primary difficulty is the matter of
definition of an "item". There would almost certainly be a series of court
cases arising from instances of application of the item veto in which opponents
of the President's action believed that he had exceeded his power by vetoing
more than an "item" as they understood the term. Certainly the situation
2has obtained in the states, and numerous cases of litigation have resulted.
6. Defeat the legislative intent of Congress . It is argued that most
particularly in the case of appropriation bills is the intent of Congress one
n^. L. W., o£. cit . . pp. IdO'-Sl, offers an excellent discussion of this
point, which is seemingly so simple in theory and yet can be so difficult in
actual situations. It is, actually, the major practical difficulty of the
item veto, and one which can dispel just about all the advantages claimed for
it.
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of presenting the bill as a whole, not as a sum of individual parts, any one of
which may be incised without regard to the others. The items are interde-
pendent, not mutually exclusive; and if there is to be executive disapproval
of an item or items, the bill in its entirety should be (vetoed and) returned
to the legislators for revamping as a whole . While this belief may endow
Congress with soo^what more credit for careful overall consideration of the
budget than actually is warranted, the argument is still a valid one.
7. It iJ. unnecessary . Now that Congress does not have the long
adjournment in alternate sessions that used to exist, there would be no extreose
delay should the President veto a bill at the end of session or after adjourn^-'
ment. If the matter is one of extreme importance, it is not impractical in
modern days of fast transportation and communications for a special session to
be convened.
8. It i^ no guarantee of economy . An economy -minded President would
find adequate means using those powers he now possesses to exercise and obtain
economy in expenditure of public funds; a spendthrift President would not use
it for the purpose of reducing expenditures, and might even use the threat of
it against individual congressmen to obtain increased appropriations for his
own favored projects.
This summary of objections to the item veto was succinctly put by the
Congress:
These objections to the proposition are fatal to it. They are
apparent on the surface of the question; but he knows but little of
human affairs and has but little experience of the unseen and invisible
consequences of political empiricism, who does not shrink from trying
this experiment, which, once adopted cannot be recalled; and the opera-
tion of which in the machinery of the government is concealed from our
knowledge; especially when the proposition disturbs the balance be-
tween the executive and legislative power over money, and vests in
the former a controlling authority over the action of the latter.
Ji.:'.]
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unknown in our constitutional history, and dangerous to the equality
of right and privilege, of burden and benefit of the members of our
Union. "^
Even a former President had his misgivings on the subject. President Taft
states (italics in the quotations below are mine):
While for some purposes it would be useful for the Executive to
have the power of the partial veto, if. we could always be sure of
its wise and conscientious exercise , I am not entirely sure that it
would be a safe provision. It would greatly enlarge the influence
of the President, already large enough from patronage and party loy-
alty and other causes.^
A rider puts the President in an aivkward position. Still, I
think the power to veto items in an appropriation bill might give
too much power to the President over congressmen .^
To what conclusions does this study lead us? It would seem that propon-
ents of the item veto raise questions and point out defects which only the item
veto can cure. But is this a valid conclusion? Many conclude that it is not,
and most careful thinkers will agree with them. To put it simply, two wrongs
do not make a right; and improper corrective action for legislative evils will
never do else than lead to further evils. Additional reform is urgently needed
in the field of public expenditures, including improvements in the budgetary
processes both in the legislative and the executive branches of our government.
But let us not patch our sails that give power to move the ship of state with
rotten cloth, else we shall lose all, and founder. Let us rather see to the
whole job of repair to be done, and sail strongly forward on our course.
3United States, House of Representatives, Coi&mittee on the Judiciary,
Report on Proposed Constitutional Amendments, House Resolutions 17. 49. 56« 66 i
and 77 . Report No. 1879, 49th Congress, 1st Session, 1886, p. 3.
TVilliam H. Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers
, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1916), p. 27.
5
William H. Taft, The Presidency
.























Arizona V 7 1910 Nebraska IV 15 1875
Arkansas VI 17 1874 New Jersey V 7 1884
California IV 16, 34 1879 New Mexico IV 22 1910
Colorado IV 12 1876 New York IV 7 1874
Connecticut Amendments XXXVII 1924 North Dakota III 80 1889
Delaware III 18 1897 Ohio II 16 1903
Florida IV 18 1885 Oklahoma VI 12 1907
Georgia V 1.16 1877 Oregon V 15a 1916
Idaho IV 11 1889 Pennsylvania IV 16 1873
Illinois V 16 1884 S. Carolina IV 23 1895
Kansas II 14 1904 S. Dakota IV 10 1889
Kentucky - 08 1890 Texas IV 14 1876
Louisiana V 16 1898 Utah VII 8 1895
Maryland II 17 1891 Virginia V 76 1902
Massachusetts Aiuendments LXIII.5 1918 Washington III 12 1889
Michigan V 37 1908 West Virginia VII 15 1872
Minnesota IV 11 1876 Wisconsin V 10 1930
Mississippi « T3 1890 Wyoming IV 9 1889
Missouri V 13 1875




















Note: Dates shown above taken from Carlson, 0£. cit
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Sample provisions for the item veto in the state constitutions and those
of the territories.
Alabama. Section 126 . The Governor shall have the power to approve or dis-
approve any item or items of any appropriation bill embracing distinct items,
and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be law, and the item or items
disapproved shall be void, unless repassed according to the rules and limi-
tations prescribed for the passage of bills over the executive veto, and he
shall in writing state specifically the item or items he disapproves, setting
the same out in full in his message, but in such cases the enrolled bill
should not be returned with the Governor's objection.
California. Article IV. Section 16 . ... If any bill presented to the Gov-
ernor contains several items of appropriation of money, he may object to one
or more items, while approving other portions of the bill. ... In such case
he shall append to the bill at the time of signing it, a statement of the
items to which he objects, and the reasons therefor, and the appropriation
so objected to shall not take effect unless passed over the governor's veto,
as hereinbefore prescribed.
Georgia. Article V. Section 1. paragraph XVI. ... He may approve any ap-
propriation, and disapprove any other appropriation, in the same bill, and tiie
latter shall not be effectual unless passed by two-thirds of each House.
Massachusetts. Amendments. Article LXIII. Section 5 . The Governor may dis-
approve or reduce items or parts of items in any bill appropriating money, .io
much of such bill as he approves shall upon his signing the same become law.
As to each item disapproved or reduced, he shall transmit to the house in which
the bill originated his reason for such disapproval or reduction, and the pro-
cedure shall then be the same as in the case of a bill disapproved as a whole.
In case he shall fail so to transmit his reasons for disapproval or reduction
within five days after the bill shall have been presented to him, such items
shall have the force of law unless the general court by adjournment shall pre-
vent such transmission, in which case they shall not be law.
Oregon. Article V. Section 15a . The Governor shall have power to veto single
items in appropriation bills and any provisions in new bills declaring an
emergency, without thereby affecting any other provision of such bill.
Pennsylvania. Article IV. Section 16 . The Governor shall have the power to
disapprove of any item or items of any bill, making appropriations of money,
embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the bill approved shall bB
A^ £~a;.VU-
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the law, and the item or items disapproved shall be void, unless repassed
according to the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of other
bills over the governor's veto.
Washington. Article III. Section 12 . If any bill presented to the governor
contain several sections or items, he may object to one or more sections or
items while approving other portions of the bill. In such case he shall
append to the bill at the time of signing it, a statement of the section or
sections; item or items to which he objects and the reasons therefor and the
section or sections, item or items so objected to, shall not take effect un-
less passed over the Governor*s objection, as hereinbefore provided.
West Virginia. Article VII. Section 15 . Every bill passed by the legislature,
making appropriations of money, embracing distinct items, shall before it
becomes a law be presented to the Governor; if he disapproves the bill, or
any item or appropriation therein, he shall communicate such disapproval with
his reasons therefor to the House in which the bill originated; but all items
not disapproved shall have the force and effect of law according to the orig*
inal provisions of the bill. Any item or items disapproved shall be void,
unless repassed by a majority of each House, according to the rules and limi-
tations prescribed in the preceding section in reference to other bills.
Territory of Alaska. Section 14 . ... He [the Governor} may veto any spec-
ific item or items in any bill which appropriates money for specific purpose;
but shall veto other bills, if at all, only as a whole.
Territory of Hawaii. Section 49. Paragraph 2 . Identical to Alaska.
Puerto Kico. Section 34 . If any bill presented to the governor contains sev-
eral items of appropriations of money, he may object to one or more of such
items, or any part or parts, portion or portions thereof, while approving of
the other portion of the bill.
Except for Massachusetts, the foregoing are taken from either Charles Kettle-
borough (ed.). The State Constitution
. (Indianapolis: B. F. Bowen i. Company,
1918), or from the New York State Constitutional Convention, 1938, Constitutions
of the States and the Dnited States . III
.
(Albany: J. B. Lyon Company, 1938).
The article for Massachusetts is taken from Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Manual for the General Court . 1955-6
.
(Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co.,
1955).
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Coimnonwealth of Massachusetts, Manual for the General Court. 1955-6 .
Boston: Wright tr Potter Printing Company, 1955.
New York State, Constitutional Convention Conimittee, 1938, Constitutions
of the States and the United States. III . Albany: J. B. Lyon Company,
1938.
United States, Conaressional Record . Vols. IV. X, XIV-XVII, LXXXVIII, XCVI.
Dnited States, House of Representatives, Committee on Expenditures in Execu-
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